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Abstract 
Recent financial crises were the root of many changes in regulatory imple-
mentations in the banking sector. Basel previously covered the default capital 
charge for counterparty exposures however, the crisis showed that more than 
two third of the losses related to this risk emerged from the exposure to the 
movement of the counterparty’s credit quality and not its actual default 
therefore, Basel III divided the required counterparty risk capital into two 
categories: The traditional default capital charge and an additional counter- 
party credit valuation adjustment (CVA) capital charge. In this article, we ex-
plain the new methodologies to compute these capital charges on the OTC 
market: The standardized approach for default capital charge (SA-CCR) and 
the basic approach for CVA (BA-CVA). Based on historical calibration and 
future estimations, we built internal models in order to compare them with 
the amended standardized approach. Up till June 2015, interest rate and FX 
derivatives constituted more than 90% of the traded total OTC notional 
amount; we constructed our application on such portfolios containing and 
computed their total counterparty capital charge. The analysis reflected dif-
ferent impacts of the netting and collateral agreements on the regulatory cap-
ital depending on the instruments’ typologies. Moreover, results showed an 
important increase in the capital charge due to the CVA addition doubling it 
in some cases. 
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1. Introduction 
Derivatives market witnessed an important bloom in recent decades due to their 
increasing utility in our financial markets. Several typologies and complexity le-
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vels of such instruments are used either in a regulated exchange traded manner 
or in an over the counter fashion. Instruments could be swaps, options, futures, 
forwards... Exchange traded activity started in 1970 following certain rules and 
“standardized” formats whereas over the counter (OTC) market came in 1990 as 
an “irregular” market with various customizable trades; therefore it is a more 
risk vulnerable environment. OTC market has a larger volume due to the higher 
profit margin and wider bid-ask spreads. Trying to reduce the risk on the OTC 
market, clearing houses were created in order to give all the counterparties a 
guarantee not to have any open positions and to force applications of the agreed 
upon rules. 
Derivatives hold several types of risks such as market, liquidity and credit, 
however the credit risk in such instruments is not the typical credit risk that we 
encounter when passing a loan; it is the counterparty credit risk. The counter- 
party credit risk differs from the traditional credit risk by two points: The bila-
teral risk profile and the variation of the exposure depending on market and 
counterparty behavior. Counterparty credit risk is the risk taking into account 
the exposure of the financial institution to the counterparty if this latter defaults 
or has its credit quality devaluated. Recent crises emphasized the faulty practices 
regarding the OTC derivatives capital charge computation from a counterparty 
credit risk point of view: Starting with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and sev-
eral near and full collapses of banks all over the United States, United Kingdom 
and Europe, the counterparty risk gained now the same importance as the major 
well-known risks (market, liquidity, operational…). Counterparty credit risk has 
gained importance making it a central need in several areas of the banking 
workflow: Pricing OTC products, computing the capital charges, managing ex-
posures to different counterparties and finally stating the conditions of a certain 
deal concerning the initial margin or collateral… Basel II had implemented me-
thods to compute the default capital charge of the counterparty credit risk beard 
in derivatives however in the subprime crisis two thirds of the losses did not re-
sult from such category of counterparty risk. A new risk source was highlighted: 
the risk resulting from the credit valuation of the counterparty noted the credit 
valuation adjustment risk (CVA). In this paper our aim is to describe the current 
OTC market, to briefly note the previously applied regulatory methods for the 
counterparty credit risk then to explain and apply the new methods in order to 
compute the capital requirements on typical portfolios. The paper proposes also 
an internal approach to compute the same figures based on historical behavior 
and future market experts’ estimations. Section I introduces the counterparty 
credit risk, Section II details the default capital charge whereas Section III details 
the CVA risk capital charge. Section IV presents the application of such tech-
niques compared to internal approaches on sample portfolios and finally Section 
V concludes on the results. 
2. Counterparty Credit Risk 
Counterparty Credit risk is a major risk faced on the OTC market. It covers two 
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facts: the defaults of the counterparty or the decrease in its credit quality as de-
scribed in [1]. In both scenarios, the bank would try to replace the instrument 
held or re-evaluate its worthiness. In order to compute this “replacement cost” 
and “potential future exposure” different factors are involved such as: Mark-to- 
market exposure, liquidity risk following a counterparty’s default, operational 
risk as in the process of managing the positions after a change had occurred or 
even in managing the margins or collaterals of a certain agreement and finally 
legal risk related to enforcement for the application of the deals conditions. As 
the use of derivatives has grown, especially on the OTC market, regulators are 
continuously trying to implement new approaches that reflect as adequately as 
possible the counterparty risk englobed by these instruments and therefore 
making their approaches more and more sophisticated, see [2]. 
2.1. Transition to Basel 
In an attempt of improving capital framework for OTC derivatives under Basel 
III method presented in [3], several reforms were put in place: 
• Wrong way Risk is more adequately evaluated by not taking recoveries in the 
loss given default (LGD) computation (the amount lost in case of the coun-
terparty’s default). 
• The computation of the portfolio exposure is required to take into account a 
stressed period values (in LGD calibration). 
• New method for collateralized transactions evaluations to capture the expo-
sure over a full year of inception. 
• Standards for initial margining have been strengthen. 
• The asset value correlation parameter was increased by 25% to reflect the 
correlations between financial institutions raising the risk weights. 
Another important change in Basel III is the addition of a credit valuation 
adjustment (CVA) capital charge to capture the risk of mark to market losses 
on the expected counterparty credit risk, this is amply described in [4]. Total 
losses from CVA were double the losses from defaults (66% from CVA and 
only 33% of the losses are due to defaults). The CVA capital charge is expected 
to double the capital charge for derivatives however, banks are not going to be 
asked to put any additional CVA charge if the derivatives are centrally cleared: 
This is an incentive to clear through a central counterparty clearing house 
(CCP). 
2.2. Default Capital Charge Computation 
All banks are required to hold capital against the variability in the market value 
of their OTC instruments: They need to capitalize for default risk. As it is well 
known for Basel amended approaches two possibilities are entitled: A standar-
dized approach and an internal model implementation. In the following, we are 
going to discuss briefly the characteristics and method scheme of each of these 
methods in order to apply them in the following part of this work and compare 
their figures. 
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2.2.1. Standardized Counterparty Credit Risk Approach (SA-CCR) 
SA-CCR is the new standardized approach for computing default counterparty 
credit risk presented in the BCBS document [5]. It was presented and revised by 
April 2014 and is in order to be implemented by January 2017. Different papers 
described this method such as [6], in our work we try to summarize and apply it 
on different portfolios under different conditions in order to understand the be-
havior of this practice. 
Main objectives of this method implementation were to be: 
• Suitable to be applied on different kinds and specifications of derivatives 
transactions 
• Easy and simple implementation techniques 
• Better than the methods that preceded 
• More risk sensitivity reflection  
Computing the capital charge is our main aim and this figure is given by:  
Default Counterparty Capital Charge Exposure at default Risk weight 8%= × ×  (1) 
Where the SA-CCR EAD (Exposure at default) is our key figure, the risk 
weight is amended by Basel and the 8% reflects the pillar 1 obligation. 
Computing the EAD would need to be held on each netting set level on a 
hedging set basis: 
( )EAD 1.4 RC PFE= × +                      (2) 
where RC is the replacement cost and PFE the potential future exposure. 
The concept of Equation (2) is referring to is the fact that the exposure to an 
instrument is the sum of its present value and the future potential values. The 
alpha factor is added as an insurance to cover the risk and the value of alpha is 
calibrated based on several internally generated models (seen in previous coun-
terparty credit risk models), therefore this coefficient is kept constant all through 
the computation. 
Hedging sets are defined as follows (details in pages 12 - 13 of document [5]): 
1) Interest rate: a hedging set is defined for one same currency further divided 
into maturities, long and short positions fully offset within maturity catego-
ries, across maturity categories partial offset is recognized 
2) Foreign exchange: same currency pairs form same hedging sets, full offset is 
only permitted within a same pair 
3) Credit derivatives and Equity derivatives: in these two categories each asset 
class forms a hedging set, full offset is permitted for a same entity (index or 
name) whereas partial offset between derivatives is applied when referring to 
different entities 
4) Commodity derivatives: four hedging sets: energy, metals, agriculture and 
others. No offset among these categories. In a same hedging set, full offset for 
same commodity is permitted and partial offset is applied when handling 
different commodities. 
The EAD formula changes in case the trade is margined or un-margined: 
• If margined: RC represents the exposure if the counterparty defaults at time 
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0t =  assuming the close-out does not take time and PFE is the change in 
value during the period between the default and the deployment of the colla-
teral. 
• If un-margined: RC is the present exposure and PFE is the potential increase 
in exposure over a one-year time horizon. 
Replacement Cost  
The RC is computed following two formulas: if the trade is margined or not 
(more details in [7], pp. 4-7. 
For un-margined transactions: 
( )RC max 0;V C= −                       (3) 
where V is the current market value of the derivatives and C is the net haircut 
collateral held. Not having any margin, at time 0t =  the replacement cost 
would depend on two possible outcomes: the instrument’s value is in our favor 
or not. If the value of the instrument is higher than the collateral a default of the 
counterpart would result in a loss equal to V-C the value of the instrument mi-
nus the collateral value, if not, no loss is included: which explains the RC formu-
lation in the un-margined case. 
For margined transactions: 
( )RC max 0; ;TH MTA NICAV C= − + −               (4) 
where TH is the positive threshold before the counterparty send the bank colla-
teral, MTA is the minimum transfer amount applicable to the counterparty and 
NICA any collateral posted by the counterparty minus the one posted by the 
bank (net value). In this case the margin should be taken into account for the 
computation of the replacement cost: if the value of the instrument is inferior to 
the value of the collateral and the collateral posted by the bank is inferior to the 
one posted by the counterparty, the loss will be null. However, if any of the pre-
viously denoted figures is positive the replacement cost will be equal to it: if the 
posted collateral is more than the collateral of the counterparty or if the value of 
the instrument is higher than the total collateral the bank would have to cover 
these differences as a replacement cost. 
Potential Future Exposure  
PFE is given by:  
AggregatePFE multiplier Add On= × −  
where the multiplier recognizes excess of collateral and negative mark-to-  
market, and the add-ons are calculated for each asset class. 
Computing the multiplier also detailed in [7], with a floor of 5% is computed 
as follows: 
( ) ( ) { }
multiplier min 1;floor 1 floor exp
2 1 floor Add on^ aggregate
V C  −
= + − ×   × − × −     
The multiplier formula is built in a way to account for over-collaterization: 
The multiplier is normally at 1 however, if the bank chooses to over-collaterize 
the instrument they are holding, this multiplier will be inferior to 1 therefore 
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giving the bank the advantage of their extra-safety arrangement. 
And the add-on computation follows these steps: 
1) Define the transaction primary risk factor. 
2) Allocate it to an asset class: Interest rate (IR), Foreign exchange (FX), equity, 
credit or commodity 
3) Compute the adjusted notional amount (for IR and credit duration is in-
cluded). 
4) Get the maturity factor (whether margined or not). 
5) Multiply the supervisory delta by the adjusted notional (+ or − 1 if long or 
short). 
6) Multiply it by the given supervisory factor to reflect volatility. 
7) Aggregate by hedging sets and asset-class level. 
For more details on the specific computation of the Add-on for each asset 
class, please refer to the Basel document [7].  
The SA-CCR add-on computation method is based on a set of assumptions in 
order to result in the previously cited formulas. These assumptions are the fol-
lowing: 
• All trades are at the money (MtM = 0). 
• The banks neither hold nor post collateral. 
• No cash flows are present before the one-year horizon. 
• The evolution process of instruments follows a Brownian motion with zero 
drift and fixed volatility. 
We note the important impact of the maturity factor on the computation: this 
latter depends on the portfolio: margined or not. If the portfolio is un-margined, 
the maturity factor (MF) applied is equal to: 
( )un margined min 1year,MaturityMF
1year
− =                (5) 
However, if the portfolio is margined, MF depends on the remargining fre-
quency. Basel amends a certain margin period of risk (MPOR) depending on the 
characteristics of the deals considered, this margin represents the closing time 
between the default of the counterparty and the margin payment. This concept is 
described in [5]. 
margined 3 MPORMF
2 250
=                      (6) 
where MPOR is defined by the frequency: for daily re-margining MPOR is 
equivalent to 10. The general formula for an N remargining per day frequency is:  
MPOR 10 1N= + −                        (7) 
A daily re-margin is the most conservative, therefore we chose this frequency 
as a base of our application portfolios (in Section II.7). 
However, we note that the 3 2  multiplier maintained by Basel in order to 
approach the EE of a margined transactions to the one of an un-margined 
transaction for MPOR (reflected in [7]) is resulting in double accounting for the 
shock (1.5 × 1.4). 
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Several comments were presented to try and remove this multiplier, such as 
the comments by Deutche bank, however, the multiplier remains present in the 
finalized version of the method. 
A brief description of the SA-CCR mentioned above is shown in Figure 1. 
2.2.2. Internal Model Method (IMM) 
As the habit went, all internal models to be applied for banks should be accepted 
by the supervisor entitled for this bank (the national regulator). The bank in our 
case study is free to choose to model internally the EAD for the OTC derivatives. 
Having this in mind, Basel implemented in its third version [3] requirements 
that should be respected in order to get approval for the proposed internal mod-
el. Please note that due to several different approaches that could be considered 
in the internal model approach, in a consultative document, refer to [8], Basel 
proposed to floor the IMM capital charge to a certain percentage of the SA-CCR 
capital charge or better yet remove the IMM as an approved method to compute 
and report capital charges under the counterparty credit risk. However, all OTC 
instruments that were not included in the internal model or that could not as-
sume approval to be globalized under the internal model should be treated 
through the standardized approach. We shall briefly describe the requirements 
for the EAD internal model but we note that these requirements are required on 
a permanent basis and continuous check-ups will be put in place in order to en-
sure the fully compliance to these rules all through the period of application of 
the chosen internal model. 
In an attempt to make this more pleasant for readers and easier to discuss the 
conditions for the implementation of an internal model will be represented as 
 
 
Figure 1. SA-CCR capital charge computation process. 
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bullet points under each categories of requirements: 
• The model should specify a forecasting distribution for changes in market 
value such as interest rate or foreign exchange rate. 
• For margined counterparties, the model should also capture the future beha-
vior of the collateral in question. Note that no particular form of model is 
required. 
• Determining the default capital charge should be based on the greater com-
putation using: once the current market data to calibrate the projection mod-
els and once a stressed calibration. In both cases the time frame should be 
three years and in the stressed conditions it should cover a stressed period in 
between (three years containing a stress among them).  
• The computation will follow these given steps: the Exposure at Default 
(EAD) is the product of a previously calibrated (and negotiated) α  factor 
and the Effective Expected Positive Exposure: 
EAD EEPEα= ×                        (8) 
Effective Expected Positive Exposure (EEPE) relies on internal model to pre-
dict counterparty exposures, typically simulating underlying market risk factors 
out to long horizons and revaluating counterparty exposures at future dates 
along the paths simulated, it is the weighted average of the Effective Expected 
Exposure (EEE). 
( )min 1year,maturity
1
EEPE EEEk k
k=
= ×∆∑                   (9) 
The EEE is the increasing function of the Expected Exposure (EE): this 
amends a more restrictive approach, once an exposure is hit the method does 
not permit a decrease in the exposure for future dates.  
( )1EEE max EEE ,EEk k k−=                   (10) 
where 1k k kt t −∆ = −  and EEk  being the average exposure at future date k 
across possible future values of relevant market risk factors, and alpha set for 1.4 
however a discussion permitting lower or greater alpha is possible (floored at 
1.2). A more detailed look on these formulas is clearly presented in Pykhtin’s ar-
ticle [9]. 
• The exposure should not only be limited for a given time horizon (ex: one 
year), it should cover the entire life of the portfolio (the OTC portfolio). 
• Again for margined transactions, the internal model should account for the 
re-margining period, the mark-to-market valuation and a sets of floors set for 
the time horizons of deals. 
• An independent management unit responsible for calculating and making 
calls for margin should be put in place.  
• The bank must present: adequate documentation for the counterparty credit 
risk (CCR) management process, validation of the models, organizational 
approval, accurate reporting and reflective results. 
• Before starting to use the model, a bank should calculate it for at least one 
year before implementation in order to have a set of observed outcomes of 
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the chosen approach.  
In the rest of this paper, we will choose for each case a given forecasting model 
in order to project the risk factors (interest rate and foreign exchange risk), cali-
brate it twice: once on a normal market and once in stress conditions, compute 
the EE and going up the formulas recover the EAD for the instrument in ques-
tion in the both cases, the maximum EAD will be our IMM exposure at default. 
We note that the calibration, the re-evaluation and the models chosen for the 
IMM could change the capital charge amended by such approaches: the relative 
variability for IMM appears to be considerable between banks. Basel committee 
conducted an exercise in an attempt to compare the outcome of such models 
between banks and recommend a best practice for the IMM in the counterparty 
credit risk framework, this exercise can be found in [10]. 
3. CVA Capital Charge Computation 
The CVA capital charge applies to all derivative transactions that are subject to 
the risk that a counterparty could default. However, the scope of application 
does not include derivatives cleared through a clearing (central) counterparty. It 
also encompasses securities financing transactions that are fair-valued by a bank 
for accounting purposes. CVA risk could be seen as a strong link between the 
counterparty and the market risk however it is by nature more complex than 
market risk on the trading book leading to different frameworks and choices 
about precise implementation. Reference [11] discusses this issue precisely. Re-
cent Basel approaches amended two frameworks for the computation of this 
capital charge: The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book CVA framework 
(FRTB-CVA) and a Basic CVA approach (BA-CVA) as shown in Figure 2. Un-
der the FRTB concept, banks are asked to compute the CVA sensitivities requir-
ing the simulation of all exposures to a large panel of market risk factors. This 
procedure is very demanding, therefore some banks are enable to cover this cal-
culation and therefore the basic approach presented in [12] is an option for these 
reasons. In February 2016, a QIS was sent by Basel to be calculated by banks on a 
voluntarily basis in order to measure the impact of these different approaches on 
the computation of the CVA capital charge, QIS found in [13]. 
 
 
Figure 2. CVA capital charge computation methodologies. 
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3.1. Standardized CVA (SA-CVA, FRTB) 
Eligibility Criteria: 
1) Ability to compute CVA sensitivities. 
2) Methodology to approximate credit spreads for all counterparties (including 
illiquid ones). 
3) Existence of an independent CVA risk management function. 
Eligible hedges: Single-name instruments, proxy hedges and market risk 
hedges. 
CVA calculation: 
At least a monthly computation is entitled: For each counterparty (even if on-
ly one derivative is included).  
The SA-CVA capital is the sum of delta and Vega risks. Each one of these cat-
egories are divided into sub-categories depending on the risk types as shown be-
low in Figure 3. For each type, a certain methodology is used to bucket the as-
sets and to compute their sensitivity. 
For each risk type in both categories we compute (refer to BCBS (2015) p. 
16-25): 
• Sensitivity of the aggregate CVA 
• Sensitivities of all eligible hedges 
• Compute weighted sensitivities: Risk weights are given by Basel for each risk 
type. 
• The net weighted sensitivity is the sum of the CVA weighted sensitivities and 
their hedges. 
• Within each bucket, weighted sensitivities are aggregated to form the buck-
et’s cc. 
• Across buckets computation results in the total capital (detailed description 
in [14]). 
3.2. Advanced Internal Model Method IMM-CVA FRTB 
The use of this method is conditioned upon approval of supervisor’s authority. 
Briefly citing the conditions: regular back testing, a trial period, expected short-
fall approach, 97.5 confidence level, cover delta and vega risks, stressed period  
 
 
Figure 3. Standardized CVA categorization. 
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calibration. The methodology is to compute internally the CVA expected short-
fall (netted assumptions) and then to compute this figure for each asset types: 
interest rate, FX, credit spread, equity and commodities in order to sum all of 
them and get the gross expected shortfall. The average of the two expected 
shortfalls is considered and a regressive formula is put in place in order to com-
pute the required capital charge. 
3.3. Basic CVA (BA-CVA) 
The basic CVA approach is for banks that are not able to compute the CVA sen-
sitivity or does not have the approval of their authorities to use the FRTB-CVA 
introduced in [12]. However, this approach is known to be very demanding and 
very conservative in terms of risk weights placed by Basel. 
Before detailing the computation of the capital charge it is important to cite 
very briefly the eligible hedges in this framework: single-name CDS that refer-
ences the counterparty directly, or references an entity legally attached to it or 
references an entity that belongs to the same sector and region of this counter-
party; single-name contingent CDS and index CDS. 
The basic CVA capital charge is given by the sum of the spread capital 
( )spreadK  and the expected exposure capital ( )EEK : 
CVA spread EEK K K= +                      (11) 
The formulation of the capital charge is intuitive because the CVA is the risk a 
bank is facing in case of a fluctuation in the credit quality of the counterparty 
therefore the two main factors are the credit quality represented by spreadK  and 
the expected exposure amount parallel to this change: exposureK . Differentiation 
in computation apply if the portfolio is hedged or not (hedging the CVA risk or 
not). Considering that no hedging strategies were put in place for hedging this 
kind of risk, which is the case for the majority of small and medium banks hav-
ing the CVA as a relatively new capital charge computation, we will apply the 
following formula: 
( )
2
unhedged 2 2
spread 1c c
c c
K S Sρ ρ = + − 
 
∑ ∑               (12) 
where cS  is the supervisory expected shortfall of CVA of counterparty c and 
ρ  is the supervisory correlation between the credit spread of a counterparty 
and the systematic factor set to 50%ρ = . 
The second term of Equation (8) is given by a simple scaling of spreadK : 
unhedged
EE spread0.5K K= ×                      (13) 
Therefore the computation is held in the cS  term:  
( ) EADb cc NS NS
NS c
RW
S M
α ∈
= ∑                   (14) 
α  is non-other than the 1.4α =  discussed earlier, EAD are the EAD internal-
ly computed earlier on a netting set level, NSM  is the effective maturity of the 
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netting set and ( )b cRW  is the risk weight set by Basel for the risk bucket ( )cb . 
The different weights are shown in Basel paper [12]. 
4. Application 
4.1. Data Used 
In the following, we chose to work on three different portfolios composed each 
time of one unique instrument: an interest rate swap, an FX forward and a FX 
plain vanilla call respectively. No netting is considered and no collateral nor 
margin agreements are added in this first step. 
In each scenario, we computed the capital charge of the portfolio for different 
maturities of the instrument (going from 6 months to 5 years) in order to see the 
progression in time of the capital charge (in standardized or internal approach-
es). 
The choice was made due to different causes: 
• To cover several asset classes. 
• To study differences between instruments with or without optionality. 
• The interest rate segment accounts for the majority of OTC derivatives activ-
ity and represented around 80% of the global OTC derivatives market by 
June 2015. 
• Foreign exchange derivatives make up the second largest segment of the 
global OTC derivatives market with around 13% of the market by mid-2015, 
and FX forwards make up half of the notional amount outstanding in this 
asset class. 
We detail the three considered portfolio in this section:  
IR swaps: We start by considering a portfolio containing one interest rate 
swap denoted in USD: one floating leg and one fixed leg of 100 USD as notional 
with semi-annual payments. The fixed coupon rate is defined in a way for the 
present MtM of the swap to be null. We will consider different versions of this 
portfolio by changing the maturity of the swap: from a 6-month interest rate 
swap to a five-year swap. 
FX forward: We consider a portfolio containing one FX forward USD-EUR. 
The forward rate is computed in such way that the present MtM is null. As we 
did earlier, we will consider different cases of this portfolio by changing the ma-
turity of the forward: from a 6 month FX forward to a five year FX forward. 
Plain vanilla option: We consider a portfolio with a single FX plain vanilla 
call (USD/EUR), long position, with maturities going from 6 months up till 5 
years, a notional of 100 EUR, a strike price of 1.4 (the actual spot is 1.0963). The 
MtM of the call is not null and it is priced using the Black and Scholes formula 
with the market implied volatility.  
The data used are fetched from Bloomberg platform: (see Appendix 2 for the 
plots) 
• USD swap curve, EURO swap curve and the FX spot rate (USD-EUR). 
• For each swap curve the observed tenors are 1 month up till 50 years. 
• Daily frequency. 
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• Historical observed dates: since end of April 2004 until end of April 2007. 
• Swap curve number of observations: 1536 per tenor (112,128 observations). 
• FX curve: 1565 observations. 
4.2. Capital Charge Computation 
4.2.1. Default Capital Charge 
Considering a risk weight of 100% and the pillar 1 factor as 8%, by multiplying 
the obtained EAD by these two components we would be able to compute the 
capital charge to cover the counterparty credit default risk (as seen in Equation 
(1)). Therefore, in the following we will just demonstrate the EAD results, final 
computation will be added in the next section. 
4.2.2. SA-CCR 
IR swaps 
Explaining step by step the computation will result in the following: 
( )EAD 1.4 RC PFE= × +  
In an attempt to replicate the SA-CCR assumptions, we considered interest 
rate swaps with an initial RC equal to 0 (we compute the fixed coupons in a way 
that is equivalent to the floating leg cash flows). As for the PFE, it is the product 
of the multiplier and a given Add-on. The multiplier is here to add the characte-
ristics neglected in the add-on assumption: referring to the assumptions of the 
SA-CCR add-on computation formulas p.16, no collateral is considered, there-
fore the multiplier is added to the formulas in order to incorporate the collateri-
zation effect. Moreover, the multiplier is floored at 5 % in order to always ac-
count for the PFE even when we have a very important collaterization. In our 
case, no collateral is recognized therefore the multiplier is one. 
PFE multiplier Add on       multiplier 1= × − =  
The Add-on depends on the asset type, for the interest rate the Add-on is 
computed as the product of a maturity factor, a supervisory factor, an adjusted 
notional and a directional delta. The adjusted notional of the IR bucket is equal 
to the notional amount multiplied by the duration of the instrument for a given 
rate of 5%. Basel justifies the supervisory factor of 0.5% as the one-year volatility 
of the swap rate. 
( ) ( )
( )
Add on Supervisory factor for Effective Notional
Supervisory factor 0.50%
Effective Notional
1,   Notional
exp 0.05* exp 0.05*
0.05
min 1year,Maturity
1year
i i i
i i i
i i
i
i
IR
d MF
d SD
S E
SD
MF
δ
δ
− = ×
=
= × ×
= + = ×
− − −
=
=
 
where iS  is equal to 0 in our case and iE  is equal to the maturity for each case 
and iMF  is defined as if in order to scale down the supervisory factor (meaning  
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Table 1. IR swap SA-CCR results. 
Maturity (years) 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
EAD (% of notional) 0.24 0.68 1.01 1.33 1.65 1.95 2.25 2.54 2.82 3.10 
 
 
Figure 4. Interest rate swap EAD under SA-CCR. 
 
to reduce the volatility for instruments of less than one year). Results for the 
EAD of this instrument are shown in Table 1 and Figure 4. 
Not having any optionality, the IR swap only “variable” is the effective no-
tional. This latter is computed as a continuous version of a bond duration with a 
maturity equivalent to the maturity of the interest rate swap (details can be 
found in Appendix 1). The duration being an increasing function of the matur-
ity, the curve is expected to have an increasing trend. An additional supervisory 
factor is multiplied in order to “evaluate” the risk of such asset class. Note that 
the supervisory factor for the interest rate risk is the lowest for only 0.5  
FX forwards 
The RC and multiplier reasoning are the same as the one previously explained 
in the IR case:  
( )EAD 1.4 RC PFE= × +  
RC 0=  
PFE multiplier Add on= × −  
multiplier 1=  
As for the Add-on, the difference in the FX type is: the effective notional 
(representing the one-year volatility) is independent of the maturity therefore 
the effective notional is simply the notional amount. 
Add on Supervisory factor for FX Effective Notional− = ×  
Supervisory factor 4.0%=  
Effective Notional i i id MFδ= × ×  
1iδ = +  
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Notionalid =  and 
( )min 1year,Maturity
1yeari
MF =  
Not having any optionality, nor implying the maturity into computation the 
FX forward EAD curve seen in Figure 5 is divided into two parts: before the 
one-year maturity and after one year. The computation is rather simple multip-
lying the notional amount, supervisory factor and capped maturity presented in 
Table 2. Note that the supervisory factor for the foreign exchange bucket is 
much more important than the interest rate amended factor (by 8 times) and it 
is equal to 4.0 % justified by the regulator as the first year instrument volatility. 
Plain vanilla call 
( )EAD 1.4 RC PFE= × +  
RC 0=  
PFE multiplier Add on       multiplier 1= × − =  
Add on Supervisory factor for FX Effective Notional− = ×  
Supervisory factor 4.0%=  
Effective Notional i i id MFδ= × ×  
2ln ln 0.5i i i
i
i
i i
P T
K
T
σ
δ
σ
  
+ × ×  
  = +Φ ×  
   
underlying spot 1.0693iP = =  
 
Table 2. FX forward SA-CCR results. 
Maturity (years) 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
EAD (% of notional) 3.96 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 
 
 
Figure 5. FX forward EAD under SA-CCR. 
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strike 1.3iK = =  
15% supervisory volatilityiσ =  
Notional 100id = =  
maturityiT =  
( )min 1year,Maturity
1yeari
MF =
 
This is another example in the FX bucket therefore the supervisory factor is 
4.0%. On the first hand, we note that in this case the replacement cost is not null: 
it is computed as the price of the option (black and Scholes). On another hand, 
due to the optionality of this instrument an additional factor is added: the delta. 
When handling instruments with no optionality, the delta factor is equal to 1 or 
−1 in order to reflect if we are short or long on the transactions. However, in this 
case the delta is computed as the normal cumulative function of a given figure. 
This is the risk-adjusted probability of exercise derived from the Black and 
Scholes formula in [15]. In the delta computation, a 15% volatility is amended by 
the regulator. Results are reflected in Table 3 and Figure 6.  
 
Table 3. FX plain vanilla call SA-CCR results. 
Maturity (years) 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
EAD (% of notional) 0.28 1.12 1.84 2.47 3.04 3.52 3.97 4.37 4.75 5.09 
 
 
Figure 6. FX plain vanilla call EAD under SA-CCR. 
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Internal Model Method 
We build our models reflecting historical observations and incorporate expert 
opinions along with forecasting visions respecting in parallel the recommended 
practices amended by Basel such as the daily steps, the numerous simulations... 
Detailed explanation on both models: interest rate and FX rates are found here 
below. 
Interest rate models 
USD interest rate model 
After the sub-prime crisis and European debt period, we are in a very low in-
terest rate environment (even negative) and all expectations vote for an increase 
in the rates (interest rates or FX rates). 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) forecasting schema is one of 
the most used and trusted interest rates projections because it is based on ex-
perts’ opinion trying to reflect and anticipate the market behavior. These projec-
tions found in [16] and represented in Figure 7, are those of Federal Reserve 
Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents.  
The data we are using ends at 0,27t =  December 2015, therefore we chose 
the forecasting of the FOMC in order to get an idea of the expert opinion projec-
tion of the market. FOMC presents several projections however we represent the 
most stressed anticipations starting December 2015 here-below: 
We can notice that the market tendency is to go up: 1.5% after one year, 2.3% 
after two years, 3.15% after three years and a 3.5% rate on the long run. There-
fore, we need to calibrate our historical model on an upward trend period. We 
chose to calibrate our internal approach to the period of rates increase of 
2004-2007 and chose the best fit calibration: calibrating the models to a histori-
cal period, projecting today’s yield curve based on these projections and com- 
 
 
Figure 7. FOMC USD short rates most stressed projections. 
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Figure 8. Calibration period on the USD short rates. 
 
paring our IMM yields with the FOMC most stressed rates in order to choose 
the best fit. 
Doing so, the stressed period chosen was: 30 April 2004 till 30 April 2007 to 
calibrate our IMM, represented in Figure 8. As an interest rate model we chose 
to use the well-known Vasicek approach. 
The chosen model that we found adequately representative of the market is 
the Vasicek model: This is an easy model, incorporating the drift and imple-
mented in most of the banking solutions. Choosing the simplest model was set 
to simplify the most this interpretation. However, Vasicek is a very sensitive 
model and differs amply with its calibrations however, following the previously 
cited technique we were able to choose a calibration that fits the market today 
following three main steps. These three steps should be repeated once on the 
stressed market calibration and once again on the current market conditions, 
comparing the EAD results we chose the maximum between both calibrations as 
our IMM given EAD. The results are as follow: 
• Step 1: Calibrate Vasicek models on the historical stressed (resp. actual) pe-
riod and get the parameters as per Table 4; the calibration is based on [17]. 
• Step 2: In order to fit the yield curves, we only change the speed of adjust-
ment k in order to find the new speed at which our yields curve today would 
converge to the calibration conditions. Keeping all other parameters constant 
reflects the market and investors’ behavior in the calibration times (notably 
in times of stress). However, by changing the speed of adjustment in order to 
fit the actual yield curve, we change the long run of our model, results are 
represented in Table 5. 
• Step 3: Based on these curves we evaluate our instruments and discount the 
cash flows in order to compute the required capital charges and EAD: The 
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maximum EAD is chosen as the IMM EAD. 
EUR interest rate model 
The same approach is used for the EUR interest rate model: Vasicek is cali-
brated on the same historical upwards choc then re-parameterized to fit today’s 
yields. The calibration and trend of the EUR curve is shown below in Figure 9. 
Foreign Exchange model 
As for FX models, we use GARCH (1,1) model to reflect the volatility of these 
rates: it is calibrated at the same time-frame and projected. We note that the 
projection results of our model are in sync with Bloomberg’s forecasting scena-
rios (most stressed) for the upcoming years. As for the pricing models for the FX 
options we chose to price based on the well-known Black and Scholes formula 
incorporating the volatility deducted from the GARCH (1,1) model. On a final 
note, in the FX instruments both interest rates and FX models are used. In order 
to remain homogeneous between models the same random variable is used in all  
 
Table 4. Vasicek parameters for USD short rates. 
 k θ σ λ θ* r0 
Stressed 0.4050 0.07299 0.0015429 5.1172 0.053500 0.0535 
Actual 0.00347 0.09629 0.0005517 −0.44712 0.006031 0.00603 
 
Table 5. Vasicek parameters for USD yields generation. 
 k θ σ λ θ* r0 
Stressed 0.21129 0.07299 0.001543 5.1172 0.035627 0.0535 
Actual 0.05309 0.096298 0.000552 −0.44712 0.008116 0.00603 
 
 
Figure 9. Calibration period on the EUR short rates. 
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models used for one given scenario. 
PORTFOLIO 1: Interest rate swaps 
The EAD value will be deduced following formulas (3), (4) and (5) of Section 
II. As previously detailed, we started to model the IR swap curve for the USD on 
normal conditions and on stressed market conditions in order to get the EAD as 
the maximum of these two sets of calibrations (see Appendix 3 for a detailed 
presentation of this approach and of the parameters estimations). We have 
modeled the behavior of the interest rate swap based on this model, we have  
projected in the future the EE, then the EEE. Afterwards, with a 1
250
∆ =  (daily  
basis) we have computed the EEPE and the 1.4α =  resulted in obtaining the 
EAD figure. As mentioned above, this was done twice and the resulting EAD is 
the maximum exposure for both sets of conditions.  
We highlight the fact that in our models, an increase in rates is amended 
therefore among counterparties there will always be one party with a higher ex-
posure than another whereas in Basel the standardized approach asks for the 
same capital charge for both positions. In our IMM, the maximum exposure of 
both long and short positions is asked from both counterparties in order not to 
perturb the market equilibrium. Trying to better clarify this previous assump-
tion: Let us consider two counterparties with the same risk profile, if these two 
parties enter an interest rate swap we will have one institution paying fixed and 
receiving floating and the other one doing exactly the opposite.  
Trying to reflect the exposure of each, one party will be paying almost null 
capital charge whereas the other will be paying an important amount.  
To keep the market equilibrium (not to add a risk premium on the instrument 
price) and not to manipulate with the market, both counterparties are asked to 
place the same capital charge. This defined capital charge, in order to be the 
most restrictive is going to be the maximum of the short and long exposures. 
The application of this process is shown in Table 6 (in % of notional), com-
paring it to the previously computed standardized approach EAD and following 
different maturities in years: 
Figure 10 shows that following a Vasicek model we can resemble the standar-
dized approach behavior on the maturities going from 0.5 year up to almost 5 
years which is the most frequent maturities encountered in such instruments for 
our portfolios. However, we can notice that the IMM gives slightly lower EAD 
for all of these maturities. The IMM-EAD is almost equivalent to 80 % of the 
SA-CCR-IMM. 
PORTFOLIO 2: FX forwards 
Again following the EAD computation technique explained in the IMM sec-
tion we shall apply our own chosen models to compute the EE of an FX forward 
(USD-EUR). The methodologies used will need a part to project the yield curve 
and another part to project the FX rate.  
Choosing the Vasicek model for the yield curves (both USD and EUR) is fol-
lowed to keep consistency with the IR swap. However, for the FX rate a GARCH  
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Table 6. IR interest rate swap internal model results. 
Maturity 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
SA-CCR 0.244 0.68 1.01 1.33 1.64 1.95 2.25 2.54 2.82 3.09 
IMM 0.098 0.43 0.82 1.08 1.36 1.58 1.84 2.05 2.30 2.51 
 
 
Figure 10. Interest rate swap EAD under the IMM. 
 
(1,1) was calibrated to the model and the rates were projected following this ap-
proach (refer to Appendix 4 for the GARCH model details). 
Again with a daily step and an alpha factor of 1.4 the results, Table 7 and 
Figure 11 reflect the EAD as a percentage of the notional amount of the for-
ward:  
We had previously seen the two different stages of the standardized approach 
EAD following the maturity of the instrument (before and after one year). Here, 
the internal model will also differ between these two stages computing the EPE 
as an average on the first year.  
We can notice that the behavior of the internal model resembles the one de-
scribed by the SA-CCR computation however the IMM is less demanding than 
the SA-CCR when using models based on one factor Vasicek and Garch (1,1). 
Both approaches converge to a 5.6% EAD to notional amount. However, on a 
certain time range the IMM “explodes” due to the time limits of the GARCH 
approach. 
PORTFOLIO 3: FX plain vanilla call 
The third portfolio contains a plain vanilla FX call option: measuring the EAD 
will demand a forecast for two risk factors: the FX rate and the interest rate 
(EUR and USD). Based on the same logic as previous applications, we applied a 
Vasicek model for the interest rates and a Garch approach for the forecast of the 
foreign exchange rate. Adding to that a Black-Scholes traditional pricing formu-
lation was used based on the GARCH-computed volatilities at each time t. 
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Table 7. FX forward EAD internal model EAD results. 
Maturity (years) 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
SA_CCR 3.96 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 
IMM 3.09 4.33 4.48 4.46 4.61 4.87 5.21 5.50 5.84 6.24 
 
 
Figure 11. FX forward EAD under the IMM. 
 
Table 8. FX options EAD internal model EAD results. 
Maturity (years) 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
SA-CCR 0.28 1.12 1.84 2.47 3.04 3.52 3.97 4.37 4.75 5.09 
IMM 0.31 1.13 1.65 2.10 2.48 2.84 3.15 3.43 3.69 3.94 
 
 
Figure 12. FX plain vanilla call EAD under the IMM. 
 
Computing the EE then following the IMM process, we obtain in Table 8 and 
Figure 12 the EAD as a percentage of the notional amount of the option: 
We can notice here that the internal model is equivalent to the supervisory 
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capital for low maturities however after a maturity of one year we have a ten-
dency towards approximately 80% of the standardized approach. We note that 
this might be due to the assumptions taken on the SA-CCR level assuming a 15% 
volatility factor whereas the GARCH approach begins by assuming lower ob-
served volatilities on the stressed period (approximately converging towards 
13%) therefore this explains the difference in behaviors depending on the ma-
turities. 
4.2.3. CVA Capital Charge 
Based on Equations ((8)-(10)) we compute the capital charge for the CVA risk 
under the basic approach, using the following: RW = 10.2% considering that the 
counterpart is a financial institution, M is the effective maturity of the portfolio 
(here it is below or equal to one year therefore it is equal to one), EAD is the ex-
posure at default computed using the IMM method on a netting set level and 
1.4α = . Table 9 shows the computation for a one-year instrument in each asset 
type. 
The previous table units are as the notional amounts of each instrument type. 
The CVA capital charge being a function of the effective maturity and the 
EAD, we can simply apply the equations on the internally computed EAD on a 
netting set level in order to get this CVA charge. Having assumed that no hedg-
ing is in place for the CVA risk, from Equations ((8)-(10)) applying the coeffi-
cients of our cases, we can get the following shortcut formula: 
CVA 0.5464 EADCC IMMM= × ×                 (15) 
4.2.4. Adding Netting and Margin Effects 
Having discussed the benefits of adding netting agreements and margins to our 
portfolio, in this section we materialize this in an actual calculation for different 
conditions on three given portfolios. We reconsider the same instruments seen 
previously, however now we will handle three composed portfolios in order to 
show the added effect of netting agreements and margin contracts. Trying to 
consider a hedging set and the effect of choosing between the standardized and 
internal approach, we consider that in each portfolio all the instruments are held 
with the same counterparty. Adding to that, we assume the probability of default 
of the counterparty to be 0.05% (equivalent to an AA rating). 
Portfolio 1: Two IR USD swaps, one long and another short, with maturities 
0.5 and 2.5 years and notional amounts of 100 USD each. This consideration was 
based on the statistics of the IR swaps in the OTC market that reflects the fact 
that 75% of the swaps have maturities less than 5 years.  
 
Table 9. CVA capital charge for one year instruments. 
 CVA Capital Charge 
One year IR swap 0.047 
One year FX forward 0.47 
One year FX call option 0.12 
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Portfolio 2: Three FX forwards deals USD/EUR: one long with a residual 
maturity of 0.5 years and the others short with 1 and 2.5 years’ residual maturi-
ties. All forwards have the same notional 100 EUR. The choice is also attributed 
to the distribution of concentration based on maturities in the FX OTC instru-
ments: <90% have maturities less than 5y . 
Portfolio 3: Two options a long position on a call of 0.5 years as maturity and 
a short position on another call with a residual maturity of 2.5 years (both have a 
100 notional).  
Tables 10-12 show respectively the composition of Portfolio 1, 2 and 3.  
Not to accumulate numerous variables, we consider the threshold and the 
minimum transferable amount null. In other words, any positive exposure will 
trigger the margin agreement. As for the collateral, we implemented ISDA me-
thod in order to compute the collateral amount as the 99th percentile of the ex-
posure on a 10-days remargining frequency explained in [18]. No independent 
amount was considered for the following exercises considering that both coun-
terparties have the same profile therefore the netted collateral value is null. We 
hold cash collateral. These are our assumptions for the upcoming applications. 
The frequency term denotes the margin re-evaluation frequency; this criterion 
will define the maturity factor used to compute the exposure at default under the 
standardized approach (refer to paragraph Potential future exposure p.17). In 
general, daily frequencies are used therefore we applied this on our portfolios 
and used the 10 days MPOR amended by Basel for such remargining frequency. 
Applying all the above, summaries for the margin agreement are found in 
Tables 13-15. 
 
Table 10. Portfolio 1 composition. 
Trade Type Currency Position Notional 
Residual 
Maturity 
MtM0 
1 IR swap USD Short 100 0.5 0 
2 IR swap USD long 100 2.5 0 
 
Table 11. Portfolio 2 composition. 
Trade Type Currency Position Notional 
Residual 
Maturity 
MtM0 
1 FX forward USD/EUR Short 100 0.5 0 
2 FX forward USD/EUR long 100 1 0 
3 FX forward USD/EUR long 100 2.5 0 
 
Table 12. Portfolio 3 composition. 
Trade Type Currency Position Notional 
Residual 
Maturity 
MtM0 
1 FX option call USD/EUR Short 100 0.5 −0.03 
2 FX option call USD/EUR long 100 2.5 1.07 
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Table 13. Portfolio 1 margin agreement. 
Frequency Threshold MTA Independent Amount Net Collateral 
Daily 0 0 0 0.12 
 
Table 14. Portfolio 2 margin agreement. 
Frequency Threshold MTA Independent Amount Net Collateral 
Daily 0 0 0 1.48 
 
Table 15. Portfolio 3 margin agreement. 
Frequency Threshold MTA Independent Amount Net Collateral 
Daily 0 0 0 0.80 
 
Default capital charge 
Portfolio 1 
• Step 1: Netting but no margin. A simple summation of the exposures at 
default of the previously computed results in the non-netted results. For the 
netting sets, SA-CCR formula for the IR class amends an aggregation of the 
effective notional in such a way to account for different maturity buckets:  
2 2
1 2 1 2
Effective notional
Eff notional Eff notional 1.4Eff notional Eff notional= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
   (16) 
This is specified by the correlation parameters supposed by Basel between 
maturity buckets in the IR asset type (cf. BCBS (2014b) paragraph 4.1). The in-
ternal model is less demanding than the SA-CCR in both cases (netted or not). 
However, the netting effect decreases the exposure of the SA-CCR by an average 
rate of 22% whereas the IMM only decreases by 7%. 
• Step 2: Margin but no netting. Applying the conditions of the margin 
agreement cited previously on each of the trades in the portfolio, we compute 
the EAD for un-netted but margined portfolio. For the SA-CCR approach, 
the RC follows Equation (4) and the maturity factor is restrained because we 
have a daily computation (MPOR = 10). For the IMM, the EAD was recom-
puted following the margin agreement. When the collateral increases, the 
EAD decreases. We can notice that both methods decreased the capital 
charge by 72%. Note the importance of the maturity factor change: In the 
SA-CCR the MF is dependent of the MPOR chosen amended as 10 days for 
the daily margin. For the IMM, the 1.5 factor added in the SA-CCR is trans-
lated as a different MPOR for the IMM: 1.5 1.5 10× ×  therefore applying the 
IMM margin agreement with a MPOR of 22.5 days would be coherent with 
the standardized method. If we chose to add only a margin agreement with 
daily remargining, no collateral, no threshold, no initial margin nor mini-
mum transferable amount, the SA-CCR EAD would be reduced by 67% 
(from the initial EAD “nothing”). With the collateral addition, the SA-CCR 
reduces the capital charge by 72.8% whereas the IMM by 72.3% retaining the 
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ratio between the IMM to the SA-CCR EAD at 78%.  
• Step 3: Netting and margin. As a final step we merge collateral and netting 
agreement to compute the capital charge. 
Figure 13 resumes the EAD of Portfolio 1 under several conditions: 
Portfolio 2 
• Step 1: Netting but no margin. For the netting sets, SA-CCR formula for 
the FX class amends the absolute value of the aggregation of effective notion-
al following:  
1 2 3Effective notional Eff notional Eff notional Eff notional= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅   (17) 
The internal model is less demanding than the SA-CCR in the non-netted and 
almost equivalent in the netted portfolios however, not by much: the netting ef-
fect is more recognized in the SA-CCR. In terms of ratios, the EAD decreases the 
standard exposure by a rate of 52% whereas it decreases the IMM EAD by 38%. 
• Step 2: Margin but no netting. As for step 2, the needed modifications are 
put in place to recomputed the EAD for the standardized approach. For both 
models, the margin agreement decreased the EAD (therefore the capital 
charge) by almost the same amount: 79% in SA-CCR and 77% in IMM. 
• Step 3: Netting and margin. Merging collateral and netting agreement. 
Figure 14 resumes the EAD of Portfolio 2 under several conditions: 
Portfolio 3 
Step 1: Netting but no margin. This portfolio is also in the FX bucket 
therefore the same computation as portfolio 2 is used in order to define the 
EAD of the whole portfolio under the SA-CCR approach. The internal model 
reflects the SA-CCR behavior in terms of reduction: the netting effect reduces 
EAD by 16 % in the SA-CCR and in the IMM. 
• Step 2: Margin but no netting. For the SA-CCR the EAD computation re-  
 
 
Figure 13. Capital charge portfolio 1. 
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Figure 14. Capital charge portfolio 2. 
 
 
Figure 15. Capital charge portfolio 3. 
 
sults in lower EAD, as estimated, the collateral will amply reduce the amount 
of the EAD: 80% SA-CCR and 81% IMM. 
• Step 3: Netting and margin. Merging collateral and netting agreement in 
order to compute the capital charge of our portfolio. 
Figure 15 resumes the EAD of Portfolio 3 under several conditions: 
CVA capital charge 
Applying Equations ((7) to (11)) we compute the basic CVA capital charge. 
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We apply the computation on the previously considered portfolios: Portfolio 1, 2 
and 3. 
Considering that the counterparty we considered is a financial institution, the 
RW amended by Basel for this CVA approach would be 5%. Not having any 
hedging, Table 16 demonstrate the CVA capital charge deducted following Eq-
uation (12) denoted earlier. 
iv. Comparative Analysis 
• Default Capital Charge:  
Starting our comparison with the default capital charge section, we need to 
compare the IMM to the SA-CCR on the three portfolios level: 
o SA-CCR: Focusing on the SA-CCR we have to emphasis the importance of 
netting and margin agreements:  
The EAD amounts reflected in Table 17 is for the standardized approach ap-
plied on the three portfolios (portfolio 1 the IR swaps, portfolio 2 the FX for-
wards and portfolio 3 the FX options). Trying to make sense of these variations, 
Table 18 presents the ratios of the EAD for each portfolio over the EAD not 
having any collateral or netting (the “nothing” case). 
In order to interpret the results, we will divide this table twice: once based on 
the portfolio therefore on the asset typologies, and another time based on the 
hedging strategies added (netting, margin agreements, none or both).  
We start by discussing the results based on the asset types: For the IR type 
(portfolio 1), the EAD decreases by 20% upon applying netting agreements: this  
 
Table 16. CVA capital charge. 
 CVA capital charge 
Portfolio 1 0.370 
Portfolio 2 2.025 
Portfolio 3 0.626 
 
Table 17. EAD under the SA-CCR. 
 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 
nothing 1.889 15.159 3.275 
netting 1.484 7.240 2.758 
margin 0.433 3.135 0.641 
both 0.293 0.915 0.464 
 
Table 18. EAD percentage of the “nothing” case. 
 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 
nothing 100% 100% 100% 
netting 79% 48% 84% 
margin 23% 21% 20% 
both 15% 6% 14% 
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is due to the fact that the notional amount is reduced when aggregated (Equa-
tion (15)) and bucketing is taken into account under the SA-CCR method. Re-
garding the margin additions change is due to the collateral add-ons and the 
maturity factors change: even if we do not add any collateral amount, having a 
margining agreement with daily frequency and the given threshold and MTA, 
the EAD will decrease per example in the netting case by 70% due to the change 
in the maturity factor. Then again adding the collateral will reduce the multiplier 
to less than 1 in order to reflect the collaterization effect reducing furthermore 
the EAD figure by almost 80%. When having only a collateral (and no netting), 
75% reduction is observed and finally when having both hedging policies in 
place the reduction will increase to be 85% which is coherent with Basel sugges-
tions that with adequate hedging techniques the capital charge could be reduced 
up till 90%. The FX typology is seen in Portfolio 2 and Portfolio 3: Grosso modo 
we can see that the impact of netting sets in this asset type is depending on the 
portfolios: for portfolio 2 we have three instruments where in portfolio 3 we 
have a strategy resembling portfolio 1 therefore the effect of netting here could 
be compared to the 80% observed in portfolio 1 whereas the impact is much 
higher for portfolio 2. One explanation of such differences might be the method 
of computation for the netting set effective notional on one hand (Equation 
(16)) and for the fact that in this bucket maturities are not really considered 
therefore this could be applied for any maturities (going form 10 days up till five 
years). Netting reduces the exposure to a half, and the collateral to 20% in port-
folio 2 and 80% and 20% under portfolio 3, whereas when applying both hedges 
the reduction is much more important hitting 95% for Portfolio 2 and 85% for 
Portfolio 3. 
Based on hedging techniques applied, we discuss the following: Across all 
portfolios, the results of the netting techniques are various: for the first portfolio, 
the netting permitted a reduction of 20% whereas this reduction was far higher 
for the second portfolio 60% then again a 15% for the third one. Margining also 
had different impacts however, having chosen to suppose a collateral that covers 
the 99% percentile exposure, the important reduction was the expected and ho-
mogeneous between all portfolios: an average of 80% reduction. The last case is 
having both margin and netting applied, this results in a 15 % for the IR portfo-
lio, 6% for the FX forward portfolio and 14% for the FX option portfolio. 
o IMM: Only analyzing the internal model based on the same approach pre-
viously applied for the SA-CCR results in Table 19 figures in term of EAD: 
Table 20 is the same table in percentage of the non-hedged portfolios EAD: 
A similar look to this table could show the differences of impact between the 
two assets types and the additional difference between instruments with or 
without optionality. 
o SA-CCR vs IMM: Comparing the IMM to SA-CCR, as per Table 21, several 
remarks could be presented, in order to facilitate the representation, the fol-
lowing table sets the ratios of the IMM required capital to the SA-CCR re-
quired capital in the same category: 
M. Sayah   
 
30 
Table 19. EAD under the IMM 
 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 
nothing 1.463 12.030 2.936 
netting 1.354 7.413 2.473 
margin 0.263 2.811 0.581 
both 0.200 1.399 0.547 
 
Table 20. EAD percentage of the “nothing” case. 
 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 
nothing 100% 100% 100% 
netting 93% 62% 84% 
margin 18% 23% 20% 
both 14% 12% 19% 
 
Table 21. EAD ratio IMM/SA-CCR. 
IMM/SA-CCR Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 
nothing 77% 79% 90% 
netting 91% 102% 90% 
margin 61% 90% 91% 
both 68% 153% 118% 
 
Based on assets’ type, we discuss the following: 
• Portfolio 1 shows that: the IMM is less demanding than the SA-CCR in all 
scenarios and along with the entity of hedging techniques. This could be in-
terpreted by several causes: the restrictive 5% floor in the multiplier of the 
standardized approach or the supervisory factor of 0.5% intended to reflect 
the one-year volatility of the rates and which is a bit too restrictive for our 
USD case. In the case of margining and netting addition (when applying both 
techniques) the IMM always amends less capital.  
• Portfolio 2 reflects a different ideology. Not applying neither netting nor col-
lateral, the IMM represents 80% of the SA-CCR EAD, adding the netting our 
IMM converges away from the SA-CCR figure (such was not the case in 
Portfolio 1 but here the computation of the netting sets differs in the 
SA-CCR) and amends similar capital requirements. When adding the margin 
agreement only, our model is less demanding by (representing only 90%). 
Last step, netting and margining the portfolio would result, in a more 
easy-going SA-CCR in a sort that the IMM requests the standardized capital 
times 1.5. This could be interpreted by the motivation given by Basel to apply 
such techniques therefore by the important reduction in the standardized 
model making the IMM much more demanding. 
• Portfolio 3 slightly differs from the previous portfolios due to the effect of the 
optionality on the netting and margining computations: having the SA-CCR 
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recommending less capital charges for optionality embedded instruments, 
our internal model seems to be a bit too restrictive. No hedging implies a 
90% capital charge (IMM to EAD) and applying both methods would result 
in a 118%. We can deduce that for the FX options portfolio, the SA-CCR is 
less demanding than our internal model and requires a lower capital charge. 
Plus, we note that this is applied for the EUR-USD FX pair with an initial vo-
latility of 13% in our internal models (increasing) whereas Basel amends a 
15% volatility factor.  
Based on hedging techniques applied, we discuss the following: 
• When nothing is applied, our internal model is representing 80% of the 
SA-CCR figures.  
• Netting effects vary between portfolios depending on the composition of 
each: in the IR and FX options where we net a 2.5 years by a 0.5 years’ in-
strument, the capital charge decreases by 10%. However, in the second port-
folio the SA-CCR was less demanding (a ratio of 102%). 
• The margin agreement effect was more recognized in the IR swap due to the 
low fluctuations of such instruments (re-evaluated quarterly) making the 
IMM equal to only 60% of the standardized figure. On another hand, in the 
FX portfolios, the fluctuations were considered through the lower and higher 
bonds of the margin agreement reducing more significantly the demanded 
capital charge (up to 90%).  
• Finally, having both effects, Basel “rewards” such techniques and reduces the 
capital in a way that makes our IMM more demanding than the SA-CCR for 
the FX bucket. This is expected because one motivation of this new SA-CCR 
is to motivate banks to margin and net their deals.  
CVA Capital Charge: In terms of ratio, Table 22 resumes the results:  
For the singular portfolios, having an effective maturity of one year the ratio is 
constant and equal approximately to 55% to 65% for the default counterparty 
capital charge therefore doubling the capital charge for the counterparty credit 
risk. For the mixed portfolios, the add-on of the CVA capital charge depends on 
the effective maturity and the EAD therefore, for our considered example, the 
capital charge of the CVA consists of around 55% to 58% of the total counter-
party capital requirement resulting in an additional 20% to 30% on the default 
capital charge amount amended in earlier version of Basel requirements.  
 
Table 22. Capital charge ratio of total counterparty credit risk. 
 CVA Capital Charge CCR netting without collateral CVA/CCR 
Singular 1 35.33% 64.67% 0.54 
Singular 2 35.33% 64.67% 0.54 
Singular 3 35.33% 64.67% 0.54 
Portfolio 1 57.74% 42.26% 1.36 
Portfolio 2 56.32% 43.67% 1.29 
Portfolio 3 55.87% 44.13% 1.27 
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5. Conclusions 
This work permits comparison between the standardized approaches used by 
Basel and suggests internal model methodology based on historical and futuristic 
observations through various applications on simple portfolios. After having 
demonstrated the process of each of the internal and standardize approaches, the 
applications showed a convergence between these two and highlighted the con-
ditions that allow one method to be more restrictive than the other. 
CVA risk adds a large weight to the capital requirement as expected, however 
its computation depends highly on the risk type that we are handling and the ef-
fective maturity of the portfolios. As for the SA-CCR, our work showed a ten-
dency to encourage banks into hedging techniques especially margin agreements 
through reducing the capital charge amended when such practices are in place. 
For the interest rate swap we deduct that the model chosen is less demanding 
than the Basel approach: On a first hand, when no hedging techniques is there, 
the model is representative at 80% for such maturities (up to 2.5 years). When 
adding netting the percentage increases to 90%; therefore the recognition of the 
netting effect is much more rewarded by Basel. On the second hand, when mar-
gin agreement is in place our model requests only 60% of Basel’s capital and 
when netted is added the same effect as a non-margined portfolio. This is due to 
the computation of the margined portfolio capital charge in the interest rate 
bucket which includes decreasing the multiplier affecting the EAD resulting in 
reducing the total charge. 
As for the foreign exchange assets types, we have different behaviors depend-
ing on the presence of optionality or not. When not handling optionality (in 
portfolio 2 with FX forwards), the internal model under no netting neither mar-
gin agreements represents 80% of the EAD under the SA-CCR. Netting added, 
the internal model diverges from the standardized approach and requires 102% 
of the SA-CCR capital charge. Again, with no netting however adding a collater-
al the ratio increases to 90% and finally when margin and netting are there the 
IMM EAD represents 150% of the SA-CCR EAD due to the benefits added in the 
Basel approach in order to reward netting and margining agreements (which is 
not really “rewarded” in the Internal Model). 
Handling the last portfolio, FX bucket under optionality, the conclusions dif-
fer a bit: In no netting no margin environment the IMM is a bit less demanding 
than the SA-CCR (by 10%) of the EAD this is due to the volatility factor 
amended by Basel (15%) which does not reflect the volatility of the FX currency 
we considered (going from 14% up till 17% in GARCH approach volatility). 
This is permitted for the standardized approach as it tries to cover all curren-
cies therefore could not be more indulgent in terms of amended volatility how-
ever, this might be modified a little if Basel considered assigning different vola-
tilities for different FX currency pairs in the options types. When netting, due to 
the hypothesis of daily re-margin and the specificity in computing the EAD un-
der the SA-CCR for optionality-included instruments, the equilibrium is not 
bothered and the EAD under both methods remains 90%. Applying both tech-
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niques, once again Basel rewards the bank and reduces its capital requirement 
making the ratio of the internally amended capital charge to the standardized 
one equal to 118%. Again, this is another example on how the standardized ap-
proach is rooting for the margin and netting agreements.  
A model based on experts’ opinion and future market estimations, even if ca-
librated on stressed historically observed data, showed as a differing capital 
amendment than the one demanded by Basel. Logical interpretation could be 
presented and reasonable choices could be made: Basel requires a standardized 
figure not accounting for the currency of the instrument should be “generalized” 
whereas our internal model is calibrated to the volatility, historical jumps, future 
forecasting... of a given market therefore in some cases could be more beneficial 
or more restrictive than the standardized EAD figure. In this paper examples on 
EUR and USD instruments clarified the common and different points of the two 
possible approaches to highlight this divergence or convergence between what 
banks could choose to use. In parallel, the suggested models and calibrations are 
a logical “mix” between the history and the future horizons trying to create a 
complete figure of the market.  
The last remark would be on the CVA capital charge, Basel is encouraging 
banks to pass the deals to central clearing houses: in doing so no CVA capital 
charge would be amended, after seeing the huge impact of the CVA capital 
charge on the total counterparty capital charge we can deduct why banks are all 
converging towards clearing their portfolios through trusted clearing houses, a 
question on the stability and coherent risk management of these clearing houses 
remain questionable in such cases.  
This work aimed to offer a detailed view of the counterparty risk capital 
charge handling in the banking sector through a description and interpretation 
of the standardized amended methodologies and by presenting and contrasting 
an internal model that is able to reflect both historical behaviors and future ex-
pert estimations. The internal approach is mostly less demanding to banks and 
reflects in a better perspective their workflow however, we should note that our 
results are highly depended of the portfolios we choose and the currency we 
handled. This should be noted for further works. In addition, the CVA was 
tackled without considering the wrong way risk (WWR) not to make the paper 
any more computationally heavy, however the WWR which is the correlation 
between the exposures and the probability of default of the counterparty, this 
will have an important impact on the CVA capital charge computation and in 
practice should not be neglected. Our next work will incorporate this variable 
into the computation in order to measure its impact on the CVA capital charge. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Supervisory Duration 
In the Basel document, one component for determining the EAD of an interest 
rate class instrument is the supervisory duration. In this computation we aim to 
understand the hypothesis lying behind the choice of such factor. 
The given formula is the following: 
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If we consider a bond with a starting date S  and an ending date E , paying 
coupons of rate α  and having a yield to maturity YTM  equal to α ; the val-
uation of this bond's duration in a continuous fashion will result in the follow-
ing: 
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Using an integration by parts process, the previous equation results in the fol-
lowing: 
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Replacing the α  factor by 0.05 or 5%  we obtain the supervisory duration 
in Equation (3).  
The duration is an indication of the instrument’s maturity because the maturity 
is capped at one year, therefore the necessity of the incorporation of that factor. 
Appendix 2: Data Used 
 
Figure S1. Historical Euro swap rates for 1 m, 6 m, 1 y and 5 y. 
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Figure S2. Historical USD swap rates for 1 m, 6 m, 1 y and 5 y. 
 
 
Figure S3. Historical FX spot rate. 
Appendix 3: Vasicek Model Implementation 
The work on Vasicek model was based on the paper by Planchet and Karam 
(2013): 
Vasicek discretization formula: 
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And getting the yield we apply the following: 
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Appendix 4: GARCH Model Parameters 
Garch(1, 1) normal conditions: 
 
 
 
Figure S4. GARCH for EUR/USD FX on the normal market conditions. 
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Garch(1, 1) stressed conditions: 
 
 
Figure S5. GARCH for EUR/USD FX on the stressed market conditions. 
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